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WISCONSIN’S COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RESTRICTIONS
PLACE THE U.S. IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LABOR LAWS
AMANDA WEBSTER
ABSTRACT:
On the surface, the United States serves as an international advocate
and supporter of the basic principles of the International Labor
Organization, which are to promote social justice and human rights
through globally humane working conditions. Yet, on a deeper level,
there exists a strained and contradictory relationship between the U.S.
and the ILO.. Despite being the largest ILO member state and a
principal policymaker, the U. S. continues to refrain from ratifying key
international labor law treaties. This inaction enables U.S. state and
federal bodies to enact and uphold legislation that directly violate
existing international labor law obligations. U.S. laws like the 2011
Wisconsin Act 10 function to eliminate collective bargaining rights for
U.S. workers in violation of international labor law principles. If
allowed to continue, this could have a devastating impact on the U.S.
economy and its global reputation.
This article discusses how the 2011 Wisconsin Act 10 directly violates
established international labor law as set forth by the International
Labor Organization, explores the economic and social ramifications of
violating these basic principles, and proposes to resolve the conflict
through the ratification and domestic implementation of ILO
Convention Nos. 87 and 98, thereby restoring compliance with ILO
principles and protecting American laborers’ rights.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In February 2011, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker
introduced the Scott Walker Budget Repair Bill (the Bill) to a
committee of the Wisconsin State General Assembly.1 The provisions
of the Bill limited the scope of collective bargaining of public
employees.2 Public workers’ salaries could only be increased in
proportion to inflation rates, and collectively bargaining for benefits of
public employees would be made illegal.3 The Bill put restrictions on
the scope of labor union elections, contracts, and dues. 4 Further, many
of the existing benefits in public workers’ employment contracts would
be slashed, including amounts paid to employees’ health insurance and
pension funds.5 These cuts amounted to an 8% average decrease in pay
to state workers.6
The introduction of the Bill spurred public outcry throughout
the state, the nation, and the world.7 A massive crowd, including many
unionized Wisconsin teachers, gathered at the state house to protest.8
Union supporters protested for weeks, with crowds opposed to the Bill
swelling to over 70,000 at times.9

1

Assemb.B.11, 2011 Leg., Jan. 2011 Spec. Sess. (Wis. 2011),
http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/related/proposals/jr1_ab11.pdf.
2
Id. at 1.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 3.
6
Wis. Assembly Cuts Public Worker Bargaining Rights, NPR (Mar. 10,
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/11/134419331/.
7
Tara Bannow, Sheila Kumar, Beth Fouhy, Michael Virtanen, & Julie
Carr Smyth, Protesters Across US Decry Wisconsin Anti-Union Efforts,
FOX NEWS (Feb. 27, 2011),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/02/27/protesters-decry-wisanti-union-efforts/; See Tula Connell, The World Watches and Supports
Wisconsin Workers, BLOG.AFLCIO.ORG,
http://blog.aflcio.org/2011/02/21/the-world-watches-and-supports-wiworkers/ (Feb. 21, 2011 5:14pm).
8
Patrick Condon & Todd Richmond, Wisconsin Protests Draw More
Than 70,000 In Largest Rally Yet, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 27, 2011),
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/27/wisconsinprotests-unions-largest-rally_n_828754.html.
9
Id.
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In order to avoid the quorum necessary to vote on the Bill,
fourteen Democratic state senators fled Wisconsin and went into hiding
in Illinois for three weeks. 10 Republican state lawmakers then took
advantage of a procedural loophole to reduce voting quorum
requirements.11 The Bill was put to a vote on March 10, before
Democrats could return to the state house.12 While these elected
representatives pounded on the locked doors of the state house and
attempted to gain entry through windows, Republican state senators
passed the Bill in just a few minutes time “without any debate and
without a single Democrat in the room.”13 Governor Walker signed the
Bill into law the next day.14
The legality of the Bill, now known as the 2011 Wisconsin
Act 10 (the Act), was immediately questioned.15 A state district court
voided the Act based on illegal procedures used to rush the bill through
the state legislation, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court later reversed
this ruling via a sixty-eight page 4−3 decision rife with concurrences
and dissents.16 The day after the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision
10

Wis. Assembly Cuts Public Worker Bargaining Rights, supra note 6.
Id. Wisconsin Senate Rule 15 requires a majority of senators to be
present to establish a voting quorum for most matters. Budget matters,
however, require a two-thirds quorum. The Scott Walker Budget
Repair Bill included budgetary matters, thus required the higher
quorum threshold. Wis. Assembly Cuts Public Worker Bargaining
Rights, supra note 6. In order to reduce these quorum requirements,
Republican lawmakers stripped the bill of its budget provisions and
created a second bill that included only budgetary matters. Id.The
union bill then only required a simple majority, which was fulfilled
without participation from democratic legislators. Id.
12
Wis. Assembly Cuts Public Worker Bargaining Rights, supra note 6.
13
Id.
14
Wis. Governor Officially Cuts Collective Bargaining, MSNBC (Mar.
11, 2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41996994.
15
Jeff Mayers, Judge Voids Controversial Wisconsin Law, REUTERS
(May 26, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/26/us-unionswisconsin-idUSTRE74P4PR20110526.
16
Jeff Mayers, Wisconsin Supreme Court Upholds Anti-Union Law,
REUTERS (Jun. 14, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/14/us-wisconsin-unionsidUSTRE75D6O520110614; State v. Fitzgerald, 798 N.W.2d 436
(Wis. 2011). The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that keeping the
doors of the Senate chamber locked did not violate the Wisconsin Open
11
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was announced, a coalition of state and federal unions filed a federal
lawsuit claiming that the Act violated the U.S. Constitution. 17
Specifically, the suit claims that public workers’ First Amendment
rights were violated by restrictions on the right to freely assemble and
collectively bargain.18 A similar suit was filed by the AFL-CIO in
July.19 These cases are still pending in federal district court. 20
The ramifications of 2011 Wisconsin Act 10 extend beyond
state and federal legal limitations. The Act is also a violation of the
United States' international legal obligations.21 This comment explores
how 2011 Wisconsin Act 10 violates the United States’ legal
commitments to the International Labour Organization. Part II
establishes the United States’ legal obligations to this specialized UN
agency charged with monitoring international labor standards. Part III
considers the ramifications of violating international labor law,
including detrimental effects on the U.S. economy and reputation. Part
IV posits a solution for these violations – that the U.S. government
should ratify and domestically implement two international treaties that
ensure protections for unionization and collective bargaining rights.

Meetings Law, which states that “[t]he doors of each house shall be
kept open except when the public welfare shall require secrecy,”
because the chamber press parlor remained open, giving the public the
opportunity to observe the proceedings. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.81
(West).
17
Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D.
Wis. 2012).
18
Scott Bauer, New Lawsuit Filed Against Wisconsin Union Law,
BUSINESSWEEK (June 15, 2011)
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9NSHK6G0.htm.
19
Complaint, Laborers Local 236, AFL-CIO et. al. v. Walker, No.
3:11-CV-00462 (W.D. Wis. July 6, 2011).
20
Todd Richmond, Wisconsin Supreme Court Asked By Prosecutor To
Reopen Collective Bargaining Lawsuit, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 30,
2011) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/30/scott-walkerwisconsin-collective-bargaining_n_1177111.html.
21
International commission for Labor Rights, Collective Bargaining
Rights Are Fundamental Human Rights - Denying Them is Illegal,
LABOR COMMISSION, http://www.laborcommission.org/ICLRstatement-right-of-public-employees-to-bargain-collectively.pdf (last
visited March 2, 2011).
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II.

AMERICA’S LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION

The International Labour Organization (ILO) was established
through the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.22 The founders of the ILO
desired to establish globally humane working conditions, thereby
promoting social justice and human rights, culling political unrest to
achieve world peace, and equalizing production costs between
economic competitors23 to avoid a “race to the bottom” scenario in the
world labor field.24 In 1946, following the creation of the United
Nations (UN), the ILO became the UN organ responsible for
overseeing international labor standards.25 As of January 1, 2012, 183
of the 193 UN member countries are also members of the ILO. 26 The
objective of the ILO continues to be to promote opportunities to obtain
decent and productive work, in conditions of freedom, equity, security,
and human dignity.27
The United States was involved in the founding of the ILO in
1919, and formally joined the organization in 1934.28 In 1977, during
22

See ILO Origin and History, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/history.htm
(last visited Jan. 1, 2012).
23
Id.
24
See Ajit Singh & Ann Zammit, Labour Standards and the ‘Race to
the Bottom’: Rethinking Globalization and Workers’ Rights From
Developmental And Solidaristic Perspectives, 20 (OXFORD REV. ECON.
POL’Y 85, 87 & 89, Working Paper No. 279, 2004). The race to the
bottom theory posits that in a global economy, without across-theboard regulation there will be a competitive erosion of labour standards
everywhere. Id.
25
Origins and History, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/history.htm (last visited Jan. 1,
2012).
26
Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries, INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm (last
visited Jan. 1, 2012).
27
See Mission and Objectives, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/mission-andobjectives/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
28
See The ILO and the United States: Brief History and Timeline,
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
132
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the height of the Cold War, the U.S. withdrew its membership because
of conflicts with the ILO’s handling of the Soviet Union and
recognition of Palestine as having observer status.29 The U.S. rejoined
the ILO in 198030 and is now the largest ILO member state. 31 It
provides 22% of the ILO’s regular budget and is the largest donor of
extra-budgetary projects.32 As a state of “chief industrial importance,”
the U.S. holds a permanent seat on the Governing Body, the ILO’s
executive committee and principal policymaker.33
The ILO is structured based on a unique tripartite
representative system. Each member country is represented by three
unique delegates: a government representative, a representative for
businesses and employers, and a representative for workers and trade
unions.34 This tripartite system ensures that the important, and

http://www.ilo.org/washington/ilo-and-the-united-states/brief-historyand-timeline/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2013). The
United States was not a member of the League of Nations, thus wary of
joining the ILO (a League of Nations organ). See id. When the US
joined the ILO in 1934, the ILO was the only organization associated
with the League of Nations in which the US was involved. Id.
29
Stephen I. Schlossberg, United States’ Participation in the ILO:
Redefining the Role, 11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 48, 70 (1989).
30
Id. at 71.
31
The US: A Leading Role in the ILO, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/washington/ilo-and-the-unitedstates/the-usa-leading-role-in-the-ilo/lang--en/index.htm (last visited
Mar. 4, 2013).
32
Id.
33
Id. Nine other states (Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Italy,
Japan, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom) also hold this
position. See also The ILO: Governing Body, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-iloworks/governing-body/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
34
See How the ILO Works, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/lang-en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2013). The US representative for
the government is the Secretary of Labor. The US representative for
business interests is the US Council for International Business
(USCIB). The US representative for organized labor is the President of
the AFL-CIO. These three representatives collectively are called the
Tripartite Advisory Panel on International Labor Standards (TAPILS).
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sometimes opposing, views of government, labor, and industry are
given an equal international voice.35
The ILO relies heavily on cooperation and dialogue, rather
than sanctions, to realize its goals.36 Much of the ILO’s enforcement
measures utilize peer pressure and shaming through exposure of a
country’s breaches of international labor standards.37 The organization
monitors and reports on state compliance of treaties, policy
recommendations, and advisory opinions.38 The ILO does not have the
capacity to engage in blacklisting or to impose monetary sanctions
when a country fails to comply with such standards.39 However,
countries exposed for violating ILO standards may face economic and
political backlash from other countries, international organizations, and
consumers committed to upholding these labor principles. 40
The ILO’s chief procedure to enforce international labor
standards is through conventions, which are legally binding
international treaties.41 It is a fundamental principle of international
law that, in order to uphold the sovereignty of nations, a country is only
bound by those treaty obligations to which it consents.42 Therefore, the
See The ILO and the United States: Brief History and Timeline, supra
note 28.
35
See How the ILO Works, supra note 34.
36
Erika de Wet, Governance through Promotion and Persuasion: The
1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,
9 GERMAN L. J. 1429, 1429 (2008).
37
Id.
38
See Lawrence R. Helfer, Monitoring Compliance with Unratified
Treaties: The ILO Experience, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 194
(2008). The ILO monitors state compliance of both ratified and
unratified treaties. Id. Thus, states are pressured to comport with
norms and standards that they have not accepted as legally binding. Id.
39
De Wet, supra note 36, at 1430.
40
See id.
41
Conventions and Recommendations, INTERNATIONAL LABOR
ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-tointernational-labour-standards/conventions-and-recommendations/lang-en/index.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
42
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, pmbl. & art. 34, opened
for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679. Once a
member nation has ratified a treaty, it is obligated to bring its national
policies in compliance with the Convention. See Id. at art. 34.
134
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U.S. is only bound by those ILO conventions that it has consented to
through ratification.43 Despite the U.S.’s leading role in the ILO, it has
only ratified 14 of 188 ILO conventions, including only 2 of the 8
conventions the ILO considers to be “core labor standards.”44

A. The Constitution of the ILO
The ILO’s constitutive document was co-authored by the
United States in 1919,45 and supplemented in 1944 via the Philadelphia
Declaration.46 These two documents together compose the Constitution
of the ILO.47 All ILO member states, including the United States, are
bound by the provisions of the constitution. 48
The 1919 ILO Constitution recognizes the principle of
freedom of association.49 Further, the Philadelphia Declaration states
that the principle of freedom of association is fundamental and essential
to sustained progress.50 Although these two binding documents
43

See Convention (No. 87) concerning Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organise, art. 15, ¶ 1, adopted July 9, 1948,
68 U.N.T.S. 17; Convention (No. 98) Right to Organise and Collective
Bargaining, art. 8, § 1, adopted July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257.
44
The US: A Leading Role in the ILO, supra note 31.
45
ILO and the United States: Brief History and Timeline, supra note
28. The US was part of a nine-country commission to draft the ILO
Constitution. Id.
46
See International Labour Organization Constitution, May 10, 1944,
art. 1, § 1 (amended 1946); ILO and the United States: Brief History
and Timeline, supra note 28.
47
ILO and the United States: Brief History and Timeline, supra note
28.
48
Andrew Ziaja, Beyond Soft Law? An Assessment of International
Labour Organization Freedom of Association Complaints as a Means
to Protect Collective Bargaining Rights in the United States, 9 GLOBAL
JURIST 1, 15 (2009).
49
International Labour Organization Constitution, supra note 46, at
pmbl. (“[A]n improvement of [labor] conditions is urgently required;
as, for example, by the . . . recognition of the principle of freedom of
association . . .”).
50
Id. at Annex § I ¶ b (“The Conference reaffirms the fundamental
principles on which the Organization is based and, in particular, that . .
. freedom of expression and of association are essential to sustained
progress . . .”).
135
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recognize that workers have the right to unionize and collectively
bargain, they do not create any affirmative obligation regarding
freedom of association that states must uphold.51 Therefore, the U.S.
has no enforceable legal obligation under the ILO Constitution to
ensure the rights of workers to effectively unionize.

B. ILO Conventions on Freedom of Association and
Collective Bargaining
ILO Convention No. 87, The Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, was adopted by the
ILO in 1948 in San Francisco, California. 52 The convention states that
“[w]orkers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have
the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation
concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing without previous
authorisation [sic],”53 and that “[t]he public authorities shall refrain
from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the
lawful exercise thereof.”54 Member states that ratify Convention No.
87 are required to “take all necessary and appropriate measures to
ensure that workers and employers may exercise freely the right to
organise.”55 The protections afforded to workers via Convention No.
87 extend to those in the public arena, with the exception of police and
military employees.56 Provisions prohibiting freedom of association for
public servants have been held to be incompatible with Convention No.
87.57
One hundred fifty of the one hundred eighty-three ILO
member-states have ratified Convention No. 87.58 In 1998, Indonesia
51

Ziaja, supra note 48, at 17.
Convention (No. 87) concerning Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organise, supra note 43, at pmbl.
53
Id. at art. 2.
54
Id. at art. 3 § 2.
55
Id. at art. 11.
56
Id. at art. 9.
57
COMM. ON MONITORING INT’L LABOR STANDARDS, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, MONITORING INTERNATIONAL LABOR
STANDARDS: TECHNIQUES AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION 110 n.4
(2004).
58
Ratifications of CO87 – Freedom of Association and Protection of
the Right to Organise Covnention, 1948 (No. 87), INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
52
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ratified it after being urged to do so by the U.S. government.59
President Harry Truman presented Convention No. 87 to the U.S.
Senate for advice and consent in 1949.60 However, Congress has never
even debated the convention—it is the Senate’s longest-pending
treaty.61 Convention No. 87 remains unratified by the U.S.62
Convention No. 98, the Right to Organize and Collective
Bargaining Convention, was adopted by the ILO in 1949.63 The
Convention requires that “[w]orkers shall enjoy protection against acts
of anti-union discrimination”64 and that “[w]orkers’ and employers’
organisations shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts of
interference.”65
States are required to establish provisions “to
encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of
machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers . . . and
workers’ organisations. . .” 66 The protections afforded to workers via
Convention No. 98 extend to those in the public arena, with the
exception of police and military employees.67 Though 160 of the 183
ILO member states have ratified Convention No. 98, the U.S. has not
done so.68

http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0:00N
o:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312232 (last visited Jan 1, 2012).
59
Steve Charnovitz, The ILO Convention on Freedom of Association
and its Future in the United States, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 90, 91 (2008).
60
Id. The treaty-making power provision of the U.S. Constitution
grants the President the power to make internationally-binding treaties
so long as the ratification is backed by the advice and consent of twothirds of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
61
Charnovitz, supra note 59, at 91.
62
Ratifications of CO87 – Freedom of Association and Protection of
the Right to Organise Covnention, supra note 58.
63
Convention (No. 98) Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining,
supra note 43, at pmbl.
64
Id. at art. 1, § 1.
65
Id. at art. 2, § 1.
66
Id. at art. 4.
67
Id. at art. 5.
68
Ratifications: By Convention: Convention 98, INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newratframeE.htm (Last visited Jan 1,
2012).
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Although the U.S. is not bound to uphold the rights protected
in Convention Nos. 87 and 98 because it has not ratified those
treaties,69 the U.S. does have some legal obligations surrounding
unratified conventions.70 Upon the adoption of a convention by the
ILO, each country’s ILO delegate is required to present the convention
to the country’s domestic political branches for consideration of
ratification.71 If the country refuses to ratify the treaty, it must submit a
report to the ILO explaining whether domestic laws are in compliance
with the unratified treaty and identifying impediments for future
ratification.72 The ILO Governing Body may request subsequent
reports regarding the status of ratification of the convention by the
state.73 In this regard, the ILO set up the Committee for Freedom of
Association (CFA) in 1951 for the purpose of examining complaints
about violations of freedom of association, whether or not the country
concerned had ratified Convention Nos. 87 and 98.74 Therefore, the
U.S. is required to answer to the ILO for its decisions to refrain from
ratifying Convention Nos. 87 and 98 and for domestic actions that
violate the fundamental principles contained within these
conventions.75 These measures comport with the ILO’s reliance on
public promotion and moral persuasion to induce states’ observance of
labor principles.76

C. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work
In 1998, the ILO adopted the Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work (DFPRW). This declaration was
69

Convention (No. 87) concerning Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organise, supra note 43, at art. 15, § 1;
Convention (No. 98) Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining,
supra note 43, at art 8, §1.
70
Helfer, supra note 38, at 197.
71
International Labour Organization Constitution, supra note 46, at art.
19, § 5, cl. b.
72
Id. at art. 19, § 5, cl. e.
73
Id.
74
ILO Decent Work Agenda: Social Dialogue, INTERNATIONAL LABOR
ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-theilo/decent-work-agenda/social-dialogue/lang--en/index.htm (last visited
Jan. 8, 2012).
75
Id.
76
De Wet, supra note 36, at 1430.
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intended to adapt ILO policy to the worldwide changes at the end of the
Cold War, the technology revolution, and globalization. 77 The DFPRW
reaffirms the principles included in the ILO Constitution and
Philadelphia Declaration, including the fundamental rights of assembly
and collective bargaining.78 However, the DFPRW goes further than
these documents to create enforceable international labor standards by
declaring that
all Members, even if they have not ratified the
Conventions in question, have an obligation arising
from the very fact of membership in the Organization
to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith
and in accordance with the Constitution, the
principles concerning the fundamental rights which
are the subject of those Conventions. 79
The DFPRW identifies four core labor principles codified in
eight conventions, including the principle of “freedom of association
and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining,” 80
codified in Convention Nos. 87 and 98. The DFPRW makes it clear
that these rights are universal, and commits member countries to
respect and promote these rights whether or not they have ratified the
relevant conventions.81
Of the eight core conventions, the U.S. has ratified only two—
Convention No. 105 on forced labor and Convention No. 182 on the
77

The Declaration: Background, INTERNATIONAL LABOR
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/background/lang-en/index.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2012).
78
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
[DFPRW], art. 2, June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1237.
79
Id.
80
Id. The other core principles identified in the declaration are the
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor (codified in ILO
Convention Nos. 29 and 105), the effective abolition of child labor
(codified in ILO Convention Nos. 138 and 182), and the elimination of
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation (codified in
ILO Convention Nos. 100 and 111). Id.
81
The Declaration: Introduction, INTERNATIONAL LABOR
ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/lang-en/index.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2012).
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worst forms of child labor.82 Only six other countries have a
ratification rate equal to or lower than that of the U.S.83 Despite its low
convention ratification rate, the U.S. championed the adoption of the
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 84 Upon its
adoption, U.S. Labor Secretary Alexis Herman declared, “the ILO has
underlined and clarified the importance of the fundamental rights of
workers in an era of economic globalization . . . ILO members have
accepted the need to be accountable.”85
Because the U.S. has not ratified Convention Nos. 87 and 98,
it is still not bound to the technical requirements the conventions
establish.86 However, as a member of the ILO, the U.S. is required to
promote and uphold the fundamental rights to unionize and collectively
bargain recognized by the ILO Constitution and the Philadelphia
Declaration, and reaffirmed in the Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work.87 The U.S. has also granted the CFA
jurisdiction to review complaints filed against it under Conventions 87
and 98.88

82

U.S. Council for Int’l Bus. [USCIB], U.S. Ratification of ILO Core
Labor Standards, available at
http://www.uscib.org/docs/US_Ratification_of_ILO_Core_Convention
s.pdf. The USCIB coordinates the US employer delegation to the ILO
labor conference, and represents business on the U.S. President’s
Committee and the U.S. Tripartite Advisory Panel on International
Labor Standards (TAPILS). Id.
83
Ratification of the Fundamental Human Rights Conventions by
Country, INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION,
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/docs/declworld.htm (last visited Mar.
9, 2012). Myanmar and Brunei Darussalam have ratified two, the
Solomon Islands has ratified one, and the Maldives, Marshall Islands,
and Tuvalu have ratified none of the eight fundamental labor treaties.
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The DFPRW included a “Follow-Up,” which was also adopted
in 1998.89 While the provisions of the Declaration were enacted
immediately, the procedures in the Follow-Up did not take effect until
2000.90 The Follow-Up requires member states that have not ratified
fundamental conventions to submit annual reports detailing the efforts
they have made to achieve and promote the core principles and rights
specified in the DFPRW.91 This reporting requirement is more
strenuous than that of the ILO Constitution, which only requires that
states submit reports on unratified conventions when requested by the
ILO Governing Body.92 Since 2000, the U.S. government has
submitted annual follow-up reports, demonstrating that it respects,
promotes, and realizes the fundamental principles and rights at work
embodied in the ILO’s Constitution. 93

D. Measuring U.S. Compliance With ILO Core
Principles
In 2000, the U.S. government submitted to the ILO its first
annual follow-up report under the DFPRW.94 In that report, the U.S.
acknowledged that “there are aspects of this [US labor law] system that
fail to fully protect the rights to organize and bargain collectively of all
employees in all circumstances,”95 and that “some provisions of U.S.
law openly conflict with international norms and create formidable
legal obstacles to the exercise of freedom of association.” 96 The ILO’s
review of the U.S. 2008 annual report noted that U.S. restrictions on the
right to organize of certain categories, including public workers, “are
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not compatible with the realization of this principle and right.” 97 One
such incompatible U.S. law of concern to the ILO was a highly
contentious ban on public-sector unionization in North Carolina.
In 1959, North Carolina passed General Statute 95-98, which
declared all employment contracts between government workers and
labor unions to be illegal. 98 North Carolina became the only state that
statutorily outlawed all collective bargaining rights of public
employees.99
Federal district courts have upheld the law as
domestically constitutional because North Carolina public workers
were still free to unionize, albeit ineffectively, and unionization is
viewed as an act of assembly protected by the First Amendment, unlike
collective bargaining.100 In 2005, after the ILO adopted the DFPRW,
the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America (UE)
filed a complaint with the CFA claiming that the North Carolina statute
breached U.S. international legal obligations to uphold collective
bargaining rights.101
The UE complaint alleged that the denial of the right to
collectively bargain had led to poor working conditions, including
widespread race and sex discrimination, for North Carolina public
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In 1977, the Virginia Supreme Court banned public sector collective
bargaining. Com. v. Cnty. Bd. of Arlington Cnty., 217 Va. 558, 581
(1977). The Virginia legislature codified this ban in 1993. VA. CODE
ANN. § 40.1-57.2 (1993).
As of 2011, Virginia and North Carolina are the only two states to
enact a complete ban on public sector collective bargaining rights.
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CFA Case No. 2460, supra note 93, at ¶ 940. The UE Local 150 is a
North Carolina union that represents many who work in “some of the
most difficult, low-wage public sector jobs in the State (janitors, refusedisposal workers, housekeepers, groundskeepers, medical technicians,
bus drivers, and other vital municipal and state employees).” Id.
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employees, and left workers with no means of redress. 102 The
complaint asserted that the U.S.’s failure to ensure collective
bargaining rights for public sector workers and to prevent North
Carolina from denying these rights was a violation of the U.S.’s
obligation to enforce core labor standards within its borders. 103 Noting
that the United States has an international obligation to “respect,
promote, and realize” the fundamental rights of freedom of association
and collective bargaining, the UE claimed that federal courts’ opinions
in Atkins v. City of Charlotte and Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Unit,
NCAE v. Phillips were, in fact, a federal seal of approval of state laws
that violate international obligations, and that the U.S. was using the
federalist system to shirk its international duties.104 Thus, the claim
asserted, the U.S. government had failed to uphold its most basic
obligations as a member of the ILO. 105
The U.S. government’s response stated that the U.S. was in
full compliance with ILO provisions. 106 The government claimed that
North Carolina workers had the right to join unions, and could
participate in the democratic process to ensure labor benefits. 107 The
U.S. asserted that state employees were provided a safety net of federal
law that secured the protection of basic labor rights. 108
The CFA found that the North Carolina law violated workers’
fundamental rights of freedom of association and collective
bargaining.109 It noted that these rights did not stem from unratified
Convention Nos. 87 and 98, but from the U.S.’s commitment to the
ILO itself through its acceptance of the fundamental principles of the
ILO Constitution, affirmed in the DFPRW.110 The opinion noted that
North Carolina’s law frustrated the very purpose of forming workers’
organizations, thus public employees were denied the full right of free
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association.111 The CFA stressed that public workers should be given
the opportunity to address grievances with the state in its capacity as
employer rather than executive, thus reliance on the democratic process
is improper.112 Employment conflicts can be addressed directly
through voluntary contract negotiations, and the problematic conditions
described in the UE’s complaint could have been resolved through
collective bargaining.113 The committee emphasized that:
the right to bargain freely with employers, including
the government in its quality of employer . . .
constitutes an essential element in freedom of
association, and trade unions should have the right,
through collective bargaining or other lawful means,
to seek to improve the living and working conditions
of those whom the trade unions represent. The public
authorities should refrain from any interference
which would restrict this right or impede the lawful
exercise thereof.114
Based on these conclusions, the CFA recommended that the
state of North Carolina repeal the anti-union law, and that the federal
and local U.S. governments promote the establishment of a collective
bargaining framework in the public sector.115 To date, North Carolina
has declined to repeal the law, federal courts have not annulled it
through judicial decisions, and Congress has not acted to bring state
legislature into conformity with freedom of association principles.116
The ILO’s North Carolina decision has implications for
Wisconsin’s Scott Walker Budget Repair Act. The ILO has found the
U.S. to be delinquent in upholding its citizens’ fundamental labor rights
in North Carolina, and if the Wisconsin Act is reviewed under the same
standards a similar outcome would likely result. Because the
Wisconsin Act severely restricts the scope of collective bargaining
rights public employees may negotiate for, the CFA would likely find
111
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that the Act violates collective bargaining and freedom of association
rights in the same way that North Carolina law does. The continued
and worsening violations of fundamental labor rights by U.S. states,
and the federal government’s failure to reverse states’ violative actions,
have major ramifications for the United States on both domestic and
international platforms.

III.

RAMIFICATIONS FOR VIOLATION

A. Domestic Economic Ramifications
Though cutting union benefits from the Wisconsin state
budget may provide economic gains in the short term, the long-term
economic effects of these labor right restrictions could be devastating.
The classic argument against unionization in the United States has been
one of economy.117 It is widely assumed that the additional costs
associated with the fair pay and comprehensive benefits that unions win
for their members are harmful to the bottom lines of companies and
governments.118 Thus, in a free-market society it is believed to be most
prudent for these entities to limit employee overhead costs, including
limiting the influence of organizations that fight to gain benefits for
employees.119 Wisconsin’s restrictions on unionization stem directly
from the belief that the state will benefit if state dollars are spent less
on state employee labor costs.120 The state has chosen to forego the
“luxury” of labor rights to promote economic gain. 121 However, this
theory is hotly contested, and recent studies show that it may be flawed
at the core.122 The U.S. should not permit violations of international
law based on a faulty rationale that may be harming the country’s
economic recovery.
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Economic philosophy in the globalized world has traditionally
hinged on the “race-to-the-bottom” theory of competitive trade.123 This
theory posits that if one nation gains a competitive edge by failing to
enact or enforce adequate social policies and labor laws, other nations
will be “forced” to lower their internal standards in order to retain
current business and compete for new investments. 124 Ultimately, as
each nation “races to the bottom,” the economic edge to do so
evaporates and countries are left with poor labor standards and no
monetary benefit.125 This theory is meant to motivate countries to
refrain from denying labor rights in hopes of an economic advantage. 126
However, numerous recent studies have shown a stronger incentive to
create and enforce robust labor policies - greater social justice actually
leads to greater societal wealth. 127
Most basically, the economic health of a state is dependent on
the economic health of its citizens. When the citizenry’s financial
condition is strong, the state reaps benefits in the form of taxes. 128 If
citizens do not have money in their pocket to spend on the products and
investments necessary to boost an economy, the state will suffer. 129
Stripping labor benefits prevents citizens from engaging in their state’s
economy in an influential way.
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Social justice and economic gain are not in opposition with
each other.130 Instead, they are each other’s corollary: in order to
achieve economic prosperity, a society requires proper labor rights. 131
Certain aspects of this concept are no longer debated in American
society. For instance, in the short term, hiring children to work in
factories gives companies the competitive edge of cheap labor.132
However, society recognizes that it is in the long-term best interest of
the child and the nation to educate children so that they might offer
more than just menial labor in the future. 133 For long-term economic
gain to be achieved, appropriate social standards that limit child labor
are necessary.134
Another example is the 40-hour workweek. It was once
believed that the more one toils, the more productive that person is, and
this is true for short period of time. 135 However, studies have proven
that sustained 60-hour workweeks result in returns that diminish to
below the rate of productivity of the 40-hour workweek within the first
four weeks of labor.136 Thus, limiting the workweek to 40 hours for
hourly-wage earners provides a better way of life for the American
workforce and an economic benefit for American businesses.
Further, studies show that, rather than being repelled,
investment is attracted by adherence to core labor standards.137 This is
130
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true in both low- and high-income countries.138 Indeed, strong freedom
of association and collective bargaining rights have been shown to have
a positive effect on attracting Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) while
simultaneously increasing worker wages. 139 Attracting FDI is regarded
by both developed and lesser-developed countries as a key factor in
generating economic growth and employment.140 Studies have also
shown that U.S. states with higher unionization rates attract greater FDI
than those that do not.141
Embracing the fundamental rights of freedom of association
and collective bargaining in Wisconsin and throughout the United
States can have a positive effect on economic investment and
employment rates. In light of the current economic downturn it is vital
that states encourage economic stimulation and workforce security.
Wisconsin’s anti-union legislation threatens to undermine the state’s
recovery and harm its already unstable economy. Further, numerous
states across the country followed Wisconsin lead and introduced their
own anti-union legislation in 2011.142 These attacks on American
unions create a serious risk to the nation’s financial health. Without
federal action to ensure that American collective bargaining rights are
protected, U.S. states may engage in an internal race to the bottom,
inflicting great harm to the country’s economic recovery in the process.
(finding that Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) tend to be greater in
countries with stronger worker rights).
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B. Ramifications Affecting American Influence and
Reputation
The United States has a long tradition of supporting human
rights domestically and abroad.143 To that point, the U.S. strives to
enforce global human rights standards through rhetorical disapproval,
foreign aid, sanctions, trade policy and military intervention. 144 Labor
rights are included in American efforts to promote international social
justice.145 Labor rights violations in the United States are particularly
troubling when the U.S. pressures other countries to ensure respect for
internationally recognized workers’ rights.146 The U.S.’s failure to
defend Wisconsin citizens’ labor rights domestically undermines U.S.
credibility in its efforts to promote respect for workers’ rights
internationally.147
The negative impact that failing to protect domestic labor
rights has on American reputation abroad is acknowledged by U.S.
officials. In 1998, then-U.S. Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole
testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the U.S.’s
failure to uphold ILO core labor standards “subjects us to criticism that
we do not practice what we preach,” and “prohibits us from bringing
complaints against other countries for failure to observe [ILO core
labor] standards they have ratified.” 148 In an effort to encourage U.S.
ratification of ILO conventions, U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch noted that the
paradox between U.S. domestic and international labor policies
“undercuts our credibility at the ILO,” and has ramifications for “the
growing tendency in Congress to refer to internationally recognized
worker rights standards regarding freedom of association . . . in U.S.
trade and aid legislation.”149 Senator Hatch also stated that “[e]ven
some of our allies have charged that our defense of the ILO machinery
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is ‘hypocritical.’”150 In response to Ohio’s 2011 anti-union legislation,
which mirrors that in Wisconsin, U.S. Senator Sherrod Brown stated on
the Senate floor, “history teaches us that unions are a very positive
force in society that creates a middle class and that protects our
freedom, so don’t tell me you support unions internationally but you
don’t support unions here. Don’t tell me you support collective
bargaining in Poland but you oppose collective bargaining in Dayton,
Ohio.”151 Former Secretary of State George Shultz has also expressed
concern that America’s behavior regarding labor rights was sending an
inconsistent message of “do as we say, not as we do.” 152 The
government’s failure to ratify and enforce ILO core value conventions
undermines U.S. prestige in the ILO and its ability to bring other
governments to task for violations of international standards and
worker rights.153
The United States has incorporated ILO fundamental
principles into binding bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with
multiple countries. For instance, in 2006, the U.S. and Peru signed a
bilateral FTA that eliminated duty tariffs and expanded trade between
the countries.154 Article 17.2 of the agreement requires that “[e]ach
Party shall adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations, and
practices thereunder, the following rights, as stated in the ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its
Follow-Up (1998),” including freedom of association and the right to
collective bargaining.155 The agreement also mandates that “[a] Party
shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws, including those it
150

Id.
The Senator’s reference to Poland involved American involvement
in assisting the ILO to defend attacks on unions made by Communists
in Eastern Europe in the 1980s. Regarding the Communists’ unionbusting actions in Poland, President Reagan stated, “[w]here free
unions and collective bargaining are forbidden, freedom is lost.” Soon
after, President Reagan broke up a domestic strike by unionized federal
air traffic controllers. John Logan, The ILO Must Condemn US AntiUnion Legislation, AFL-CIO (Apr. 26, 2011),
http://www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/speakout/
john_logan_ilo.cfm?RenderForPrint=1.
152
Schlossberg, supra note 29, at 76.
153
Id. (quoting AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland).
154
Unites States - Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Feb. 1,
2009.
155
Id. at art. 17.2.
151

150

Journal of International Law

adopts or maintains in accordance with Article 17.2.1, through a
sustained or recurring course of action or inaction. . .”156 Similar
requirements are included in FTAs between the U.S. and Australia,
Bahrain, Central America, the Dominican Republic, Chile, Jordan,
South Korea, Morocco, Oman, Panama, Singapore, and Colombia. 157
The agreements with Peru (implemented in 2009) and Colombia
(signed by both countries and pending implementation) provide for
particularly stringent enforceability of labor standards through the same
procedures as all other provisions in those treaties. 158
These labor commitments between the U.S. and other
countries carry real consequences if a party is found to be in violation
of ILO principles. Because the standard incorporated into these FTAs
is monitored by the ILO, if the ILO examines U.S. policies and finds
them to breach core labor principles these countries may claim the U.S.
is violating bilateral FTAs as well. Therefore, Wisconsin’s law puts the
United States at risk of violating not just ILO requirements, but also
legally enforceable treaties with economic partners around the globe.
Because the agreements with Peru and -Colombia, which carry the
strictest compliance requirements, had entered into force after ILO’s
North Carolina decision or are pending entry, a new decision by the
ILO finding the U.S. violations could trigger trade ramifications against
the U.S. that were not at issue when the North Carolina case was
decided. Thus, it is imperative for the U.S. to take action now to
prevent such an ILO decision.

IV.

SOLUTION: RATIFY AND DOMESTICALLY IMPLEMENT
CONVENTIONS 87 AND 98

Federal laws have proven insufficient in protecting workers’
rights. Without Congressional action, states may continue to create and
156
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enforce laws that violate international norms with impunity. In order to
create domestically enforceable standards for international legal rights,
Congress must integrate its foreign legal commitments with federal
law. One solution to ensure compliance with ILO requirements and
enforcement of American workers’ rights would be ratification and
domestic implementation of ILO Conventions 87 and 98.
Article VI § 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the Supremacy Clause,
states that the Constitution, federal laws, and “all treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States” are the
“supreme law of the land.”159 This clause assures that the Constitution,
federal laws, and treaties take precedence over state laws and bind all
judges to adhere to that principle in their courts. 160 State law must be
compliant with the U.S.’s international legal commitments.161 The
Supreme Court has determined that ratified ILO conventions create
rights for individuals in the U.S.162 If the United States ratified ILO
Conventions 87 and 98, these treaties would likely give U.S. citizens a
cause of action in domestic courts for violations of their right to freely
associate and collectively bargain.163 State laws in violation of ILO
legal standards, including Wisconsin’s Budget Repair Act, would have
to be found void in U.S. courts.
However, in order for ratification of ILO conventions to have
domestic impact, the federal government likely must take steps to
execute the provisions of the treaties domestically through legislation.
Though treaty ratification binds the U.S. internationally (and the U.S.
can be found to be in violation of international laws without domestic
implementation), U.S. courts do not consider treaties to be binding
domestic law without domestic execution,164 and it is domestic liability
that has more “bite” to its ramifications. 165 As held in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 2008 Medellin v. Texas decision, a treaty is
considered binding domestic law only if the treaty expressly states that
it is self-executing (which is uncommon) or U.S. Congress enacts
159
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statutes which domestically implement the treaty. 166 Thus, the federal
government’s process to enforce ILO core labor standards domestically
is two-fold. First, the President must ratify the conventions with the
advise and consent of two-thirds of the Senate.167 Second, Congress
must pass statutes that incorporate ILO core labor standards into
binding domestic law.168 Considering the relentless gridlock Congress
faces when making influential changes to American life, this challenge
may seem insurmountable. However, the protection of the United
States’ economic future and the fundamental labor rights of its citizens
is an important cause worth coming together for.

V.

CONCLUSION

The United States is the leader of the global economy, and the
richest nation in the world.169 It is also a leader in the ILO, and has the
power to help to improve conditions for workers all over the world.170
Yet, while the U.S. requires other countries to heighten their labor
standards, it fails to ensure fundamental labor rights for its own citizens
domestically.171
As a member of the ILO, the U.S. must ensure certain
minimum labor standards for its citizens. These standards, defined in
the ILO Constitution and re-affirmed in the Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, include freedom of
association and the right to collectively bargain as fundamental rights
that countries must uphold. Michigan’s restrictions on the collective
bargaining power of public employees denies state workers their
fundamental international labor rights. Without taking action to strike
the Wisconsin law down, the U.S. is in violation of it’s international
commitments to the ILO and other member states.
166
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In order to restore compliance with ILO core principles and
protect American laborers’ rights at work, the President and Congress
should ratify and domestically implement ILO Convention Nos. 87 and
98, which protect workers’ freedom of association and rights to
collectively bargain, prospectively. If ratified and domestically
implemented, these conventions would be adopted as part of U.S.
domestic law. Wisconsin’s contrary law would then be invalid under
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Ratifying ILO
Convention Nos. 87 and 98 would protect workers in Wisconsin, and
across the United States, from being denied globally-recognized
fundamental rights.
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